2016 note to reader: Be careful when reading phrases like, "former state of Palestine," as it appears in the opening section. Palestine was not a free nation under Syrian domination in past centuries. Palestine was a section within Syria. Palestine was never a nation in its own right like, for example, Iraq or Egypt.
My thanks to readers and comments welcome as I continue to finish this blog.
-- Lurene Gisee
My contact into still valid in December of 2018:
lurenexyz@gmail.com
(360) 656-6838
SYRIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF 1973
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 350
COURSE AT SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY
STUDENT, LURENE KATHLEEN HELZER (Gisee)
NOVEMBER 11, 1991 CLASS PAPER
Photo showing Syrian leader Hafez al Assad, on right, found on Wikipedia.
Here is link below for more information on the photo and the subject of Yom Kippur War:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hafez_al-Assad#/media/File:Assad_Tlass_war_1973.jpg
Link below the now-declassified notes of meeting near Tel Aviv to discuss the Yom Kippur War, which was then still in progress from the United States archives. Just paste the line below into your browser:
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-56.pdf
Table of Contents:......[This blog is being constructed. Please forgive any temporary typing errors. -- Lurene]
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1.
On October 6, 1973, Syria joined a coalition of Arab military forces to attack Israel. Syria's immediate aim was to recapture the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Under the leadership of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, however, Syria's historic claim to the former state of Palestine also played a significant role. So Syria's motivation was dual: to recapture lost territory in the short-run and, in the long-run, to set the stage for Syrian dominance of the immediate region.
Syria, while having these motivations, approached the war cautiously by letting Egypt under Anwar Sadat lead the effort. Indeed, to this day, the 1973 Ramadan War is defined as an Egyptian initiative above all other definitions. This is not completely false, nor is it completely accurate. While it is certainly true that it was Egypt that approached Syria about war plans in March of 1973, it is also important to note that by the time Sadat's emissaries arrived in Damascus for formal discussions, Assad had amassed a plethora of new weapons during the previous year (Sucher 748). Also, when negotiations commenced following the conflict, Syria stood quite apart from Egypt. So while Syria may have appeared to be riding on on Egyptian coattails, the war was as much a Syrian initiative as it was an Egyptian one.
Still, Syria, for all its hopes and ambitions, won little by fighting the war relative to what it had hoped to gain. Syria in the end did not recapture the Golan Heights from Israel. As for the diplomatic aspect, Syria's victory rang absolutely hollow; Syria accomplished little more than a disengagement agreement -- a reluctant deal at that.
The idea that the Arabs want to see the complete destruction of the state of Israel is not accurate as it is usually stated by proponents of this view. Rhetoric aside, there is no real evidence to support the absolutist assertion that all Arab nations nurse a policy in which the ultimate goal is the annihilation of the Jewish nation.
However, it does seem reasonable to place the idea on a scale. That is, if all of the Arab nations were studied with respect to their dedication to a policy of running the Israelis into the sea, some nations would be on the high end of the scale and others would be on the low end. For example, Lebanese citizens might harbor deep hatred for the Israelis, but rebuilding their own nation and surviving under the domination of Syria would rank higher in their list of concern. Saudi Arabia might give the anti-Israel policy much consideration as well, but the oil-rich state finds it more important to keep the oil flowing to the consumers in the United States. Thus, the Saudis can not go too far with such a policy.
The exiled Palestinian nation, on the other hand, perceives its exile to be the fault of Israel. It would rank high on this scale. Where is Syria on this scale?
Syria is right near the top, following only the Palestinians themselves.
"How can the Palestinian question not be ours, even though we are placing all of this country's human, military, economic, and political resources at the service of this question?" Assad said in January of 1985 (Pipes) 130).
This statement is not simple rhetoric. Syria has endorsed suicide attacks against Israelis in Lebanon, has proclaimed itself to be the "heart, mind, shield, and sword: of Palestine, has time and time again stated that the land which Israel now occupies is part of Syria, has refused to recognize the state of Israel, and has consistently been the Arab nation to take the hardest line in negotiations involving Israel.
"Jesus Christ was a Syrian Jew," Assad is fond of saying (Pipes 127-130).
In fact, Assad has also said that he wants "Palestine first and the Golan second." (Pipes 131) So the problem as Syria perceived it was not simply that the Israelis were occupying the Golan Heights, it was also the larger issue of Israeli occupation of the Syrian province of Palestine.
But this is the problem as Syria perceives it on the macro-level. A series of smaller incidents led to the Syrian decision to strike on October 6, 1973:
-- In August of 1973, the Galili plan was adopted in Israel. It was a development plan for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the integration of Arab agriculture and industry in those regions. It called for new Jewish settlements. Especially disturbing for the Syrians, it called for an industrial development in the Golan Heights. This, the Syrians thought, was an insult to the very idea of a peace process. The the Syrians, it seemed the Israelis were bent on taking as much Arab territory as possible. (Sachar 741)
-- Also irritating existing tensions was the "War of Attrition" which took place between March of 1969 and July of 1970. Rather than leading to any meaningful negotiations leading to the return of occupied Arab territory, it further frustrated the Egyptian, Palestinian, Syrian and Jordanian participants. This conflict, while it can not be classified as a war in the conventional sense, was one of the first "low-intensity conflicts." The goal of the Arab states in this was was to slowly bleed Israel of its military, human and motivational resources through frequent, low-level military assaults over a long period of time (Safran 264).
-- Since Israel was occupying the Sinai in Egypt, the Egyptians under Anwar al-Sadat found the missing revenues from the Suez Canal painful. Suffering a population surplus, Egypt needed the Canal not only for its income-generating value, but it also needed to rebuild its cities along the canal and employ Egyptians in such areas. Sadat had also been running Egypt's economy on the resumption of war, which created apprehension in the Egyptian military. Sadat needed military support to either liberate the Sinai or to remain complacent while he placed the economy on a firm base -- a base which was nonexistent. Sadat himself knew that if he did not enjoy the support of the Egyptian military, his presidency could easily be usurped (Sachar 747).
-- Frustration mounted because of the perception by Arab leaders that the United States, Soviet Union and United Nations were not acting decisively enough to force Israel to make diplomatic concessions (Safran 262). Simultaneously, Israel's government was taking a turn to the right as the Likud party gained prominence (Sachar 741).
Summarizing, Syria entered the war for all of the above reasons, with the chief reason being to break a frustrating diplomatic stalemate. But this was only one period in a long history of frustrations between Arabs and Israelis.
2. Background of the Conflict: A Long, Sore Wound in the Arab World.
The rise of the state of Israel in 1948 came after a long effort by Arab nations to block its creation.
The roots of the modern Arab-Israeli struggle can be traced back to the League of Nations mandate of Britain over Palestine. The fate of the mandated areas were largely in British control. In 1917, the Balfour Declaration came out of London -- a vague document which promised to the Jews British support in the creation of a Jewish "National Home" in Palestine (Macredis 384).
This document has become not only a classic in the long line of British boo-boos, but has indirectly been the source of numerous wars in the Middle East since 1948. November 2, 1917, the document was actually a letter from British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to the honorary president of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild. The document, a three-paragraph letter, was approved by the British Cabinet after an "a" was put in the place of a 'the' in the text of the letter. So instead of saying "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of the national home for the Jewish people...", it said the government favored the establishment of "a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed b y Jews in any other country." (Mendes-Flohr, Reinharz 458)
This left the true intentions of the document open to interpretation. The British were deliberately vague. This led to two different interpretations: one that said the document gave the green light for the establishment of a Jewish state and one that said the Jews could live in the existing state of Palestine. There is a difference between "A" national home and "The" national home, especially in official documents. Yet, when the League of Nations wrote their Mandate for Palestine in July of 1922, they compounded the error by referring to "a" national home for Jews in the first reference, and "the national home for Jews in t he subsequent three references (Mendes-Flohr, Reinharz 461).
As insignificant as these details my seem, they led to the conflict that we see today between Arabs and Israelis. In the minds of many Arabs, the original documents were grossly misinterpreted and the state of Israel was created illegitimately. Taking this further, did the British ever have a right to decide the fate of Palestine? According to the Syrian view, as was explained earlier in the paper, the Syrians were the only people qualified to decide the fate of Palestine. Before the entrance of the European powers, the term Syria was understood as a region comprising what we now call modern Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and portions of Southeastern Turkey (Pipes 14). This was a well-documented historical fact; the Encyclopaedia Britannica of 1911 defined Palestine as "the southern third of the province of Syria." (Pipes 14)
Arguments can be made that whatever the region was called, there was no Syrian national self-identity until the creation of the Syrian state after World War II; residents of Allepo considered themselves apart from residents of Jerusalem. But that argument flies in the face of logic to the Syrian; the German nation is nothing if not a loose confederation of tribes which eventually became a nation.
But whatever the arguments, the British managed to enmesh the Syrians in a confusing web of national identities after 1915. Syria was butchered into several sections. Some sections were promised to the Ottoman Turks, others to the French, still others to the Jews. All of this happened in the years between 1915 and 1923. After World War II, it was the former French-administered area only that became the modern state of Syria. So what we have is a Syria before 1915, which modern Syrians regard as the only legitimate Syria, and the Syria after 1923, which was far from legitimate. It was this latter Syria that became the independent Syrian state in 1946 -- poised to cry foul when the new Jewish state was declared just two years later.
Having that background, it is enough to say that all of the Arab-Israeli wars since 1948 involving Syria have grown from the seeds planted by the British and French during those years. No one, not even the Syrians themselves, could have foreseen the tremendous crop those seeds would yield.
There had been no decade of peace between Arabs and Israelis since:
1948 -- War follows declaration of state of Israel
1956 -- Suez War
1967 -- Six-Day War
1969 -- War of Attrition
1973 --The October War, Ramadan War or Yom Kippur War
1982 -- Israeli/Lebanese conflict (Macridis 384)
1990 -- Iraq attacks Israel, unsuccessfully
This is by no means an exhaustive list of Arab/Israeli conflicts. There have also been countless other incidents of terrorism, infiltration, repression, covert action, violent protest ( the Intifada) and outright, hateful murder -- Jew to Arab and Arab to Jew. The 1973 was was just one incident of many.
B. The Choice and Process of Implementation
1. The Choice
Syria decided to join Egypt in an attack on Israel. They together carefully planned to attack on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, which also happens to fall on the period of the Moslem holy month of Ramadan. They achieved total strategic surprise, as they had planned. The surprise attack was well planned, however.
2. Process of Implementation
Syria began by responding positively to Egypt's idea to attack Israel.
In March of 1973, Sadat sent emissaries to Damascus to propose joint military action against Israel (Sachar 748). Because of earlier shipments of arms by the Soviet Union, Syria was the most heavily armed nation, per capita, in the Arab world.
From the Soviets they had received 300 new tanks, 300 MiG-21 fighter planes, and hundreds of late-model SAM-6 missiles (Sachar 748).
By the time Sadat's emissaries had arrived in Damascus in March, Syria was well-endowed.
Following this crucial meeting, a series of joint Egyptian-Syrian meetings were held between the respective chiefs of staff. Plans were devised for a two-pronged attack under Egyptian command. Sadat went to Damascus in May and June of 1973 to confirm the plan with Syrian elites. They devised a plan with the following highlights:
-- Syria would keep the Israeli forces busy near the Golan Heights, which is strategically tight, so that Egyptian forces could gain time to make advances in the Sinai.
-- Jordan would divert Israeli troops from both the Syrian and Egyptian fronts.
-- Arab forces should not venture far into Israeli territory until a number of Israeli planes were thrown out of service trying to destroy Egyptian air-defense systems.
-- Arab air power would be used largely after a portion of the Israeli Air Force was knocked out.
-- Along the Suez, Egyptian troops were to cross in such a way as to confuse the Israelis. A main thrust was supposed to be nonexistent to the Israeli eye (Safran 280 - 281).
a) Arab Negotiations and Deals Before the War: a Seemingly Foolproof Plan.
In the months preceding the war, extensive diplomatic arrangements had to be made by Sadat. In Saudi Arabia, King Feisal had to be convinced and persuaded that Sadat was not a reincarnated version of former Egyptian leader Gamel Abdel Nasser. Feisal never liked Nasser because of his socialist point of view. Sadat, knowing this and also knowing that he would need the support of Feisal, went to Riyadh in August of 19713 to mend relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Approaching the Saudi king with humility and deference, he managed to obtain a promise of a Saudi oil embargo (Sachar 748 - 749). This was to be directed against western nations in case the West took the Israeli side and also if the war took a turn against the Arab forces.
Sadat also need to solidify his relation with King Hussein of Jordan, a relationship also strained by Nasserism. This was more difficult because of Syria. Just three years before, Syria had invaded Jordan in an effort to combat hostile PLO forces stationed there near the Syrian border. Sadat held meetings with Hussein throughout June and July in order to gain his support. By September 10, Hussein and Assad were in Cauro making tactical agreements. (Sachar 749) Hussein only agreed to threaten Israeli forces along the West Bank, however, and stopped short of agreeing to mount a full-scale offensive.
Meanwhile, in the Soviet Union, Soviet Jews were pressing the government for emigration rights to Israel through demonstrations. The Soviets, afraid that this activism could spark a chain reaction among other discontented minorities in the Soviet Union, were also angry about the demonstrations because, by calling attention to the plight of Soviet Jews, they felt their trading status with the United States might be in jeopardy. This was the era of detente and it was a fragile detente. The Soviet Jews were viewed by the Soviet leadership as the factor that could upset that detente at least in part.
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sun july 24 2016
With these concerns in mind, the Soviets were open to the idea of providing arms to the Arab allies to carry out their campaign. By helping the Arab nations regain land they had lost in the 1967 war, they hoped to cripple the Soviet Jewish absorption process by at least afflicting Israel with an economic as well as military handicap.
But the Soviets had their reservations. The Soviets were kicked out of Egypt in July of 1972, and were still embittered about the matter. They were also unsure that the Arab armies, having been beaten in 1967, had any more of a capability to make gains in Israel than they did before. But seeing a chance to gain the influence they had recently been losing, they decided to help the Arab armies with weapons to Egypt as well as Syria. The Soviet effort also included intelligence information to the Arab forces on Israeli defense positions in the north and south, which they were able to provide through Cosmos satellite photograph. (Sachar 749)
b) Tools of Persuasion: A Pandora's Box
(1) Trade and Investment Regulations: The Arab Oil Embargo
One of the biggest miscalculations on the parts of Syria and Egypt was the reliance on the Arab oil weapon. Although the oil card had all the promise of forcing the nations of Europe and North America to deal on Arab terms, it failed ultimately because the producing nations had divergent goals.
Plans for an Arab oil embargo were in place before a gun was fired. As mentioned previously, Sadat had made diplomatic rounds in the months preceding the was ro assure Saudi cooperation in implementing an oil embargo. Sadat walked away confident that nothing could go wrong.
This was not the outcome of the oil embargo, however, because a total embargo of oil required cooperation from all of the oil-producing states of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC and OAPEC). From the beginning, it was a lofty, unrealistic goal.
When the war broke out, the American President Richard Nixon received a memorandum warning the administration against resupplying the Israeli army. If the U.S. provided support to Israel, the memo warned, Aramco was prepared to make a major cutback in the production of oil. Making good on the threat, OAPEC on October 17 announced an immediate 5 percent production cutback from their meeting location of Kuwait. They were even more stringent in adding that, until Israeli forces were withdrawn from Arab territories, the "same percentage will be applied in each month compared with the previous one." (Shwadran 47)
This was carried out. In fact, some countries cut production more than 5 percent. Total oil embargoes were imposed on states which supported Israel -- the United States and the Netherlands. At the next meeting in Kuwait on November 5, 1973, it was announced by OAPEC that the total cut would be limited to 25 percent from October 1, 1973 production levels (Swadran 47).
Indeed, the consuming nations did suffer oil shocks. On December 23, 1973, OPEC raised the posted price of crude to $11.65 a barrel from the October 1 price of only $2.59 -- a 400 percent increase. Simultaneously, OAPEC announced it was increasing oil supplies by 10 percent. As this was going on, different representatives of oil-producing nations were releasing different statements. Consuming nations scrambled to decide what their next move should be. But a scramble was going on between the oil-producing nations themselves (Shwadran 49).
Part of the problem was that Saudi Arabia and Egypt wanted to lift the embargo, while Algeria, Syria and Libya did not. A meeting on February 12, 1974 in Algiers between these nations ended without resolution because Syria was insisting that Israel disengage unconditionally before the lifting of the embargo. The embargo was never actually lifted until March 18, 1974, over the objections of the Syrians. It lasted less than five months (Shwadran 52). But who were the nations involved and what were their individual motivations?
Syria was at the forefront of the "radical" group of oil nations, who were in favor of continuing the embargo for ideological reasons, which is the same reason they advocated the oil embargo in the first place. Furthermore, Syria has never had the same potential for gaining oil revenues as have the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf. Oil is more valuable to Syria as a political weapon than as a revenue-producing resource.
The conservative oil states, on the other hand, had the limited aim of causing a moderate rise in the price of oil. The embargo was nothing more than an economic tool with some potential political benefits. Once the prices shot up drastically, King Feisal was ready to resume production as normal.
Other nations, aside from fitting roughly in one group or the other -- conservative or radical -- could be subdivided into three distinct groups: Gulf nations which depend exclusively on oil revenues, are small oil producers, and ordinarily sell oil according to relatively stable contractual conditions. This group would include Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and some members of the United Arab Emirates. In the second category, which includes Iran, Iraq, and Algeria, the main goal is to sell as much oil as possible at the highest prices possible. These nations tend to have large populations and large capital needs and are fairly rich in oil resources. These nations tend to be consistently in favor of high oil prices, no matter what tactics must be implemented to achieve them Iran, for example, had no interest in conserving its oil resources. Iran, under the Shah at the time, was interested in selling its oil as quickly and expensively as possible in order to diversify and modernize the economy as quickly as possible. The long-term prospects for the oil market were not in the realm of Iranian concerns (Shwadran 55).
Lastly, there was a third group which comprised Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi. These nations, while willing to go along with the embargo for a short while to raise prices moderately, have no interest in prolonging embargoes. They have small populations, high reserves of oil and an interest in the long-term oil market. These nations were fearful that the western nations would develop alternatives to Middle Eastern oil, putting them for all intents and purposes out of business. (Shwadran 65).
Because the embargo only lasted five months, it is clear that the Saudis were able to run off this the pot of gold. So did the Egyptians, who wanted to end the embargo to gain U.S. assistance in negotiating with Israel. Only by ending the embargo could Egypt enlist U.S. help in getting a favorable settlement from the Israelis. This is an important detail because this is the factor that ultimately left Syria behind in the dust. Once the individual Arab states obtained benefits from the embargo, Arab unity crumbled and Syria was left feeling betrayed. This is because Syria did not realize that there was actually very little connection between the embargo and the war. The embargo was carried out by the majority of the oil-producing states for purely economic reasons (Shwadran 65).
(3) Syria's Use of Psychological Manipulation
Syria's use of Israeli war prisoners turned out to be a source of grief for Israel. Syria, knowing that it had few cards, maximized the value of the prisoners for the psychological value in the hostilities against Israel. Asked b y the U.S. and Israel to provide a list of the prisoners held, or to allow Red Cross inspections, were met with absolute refusal by the Syrians. Finally, when in mid-February of 1974 Henry Kissinger offered the Syrians money and technology, the Red Cross visited the prisoners, finding that 42 of them were killed in t he vicinity of the Golan Heights and eleven had died while in captivity. But without a doubt, it was Syria's tough position on the POW issue which prompted Kissinger to offer Assad financial and technical aid (Sachar 798).
(5) Military Aid and Advice
Syria's main ally aside from its Arab partners was the Soviet Union. Before the war, the Soviets had given the Syrians a number of weapons, as detailed earlier in this paper. But later in the war, the soviets again had to intervene, this time as a counterbalance to the American/Israeli relationship.
While this may have been a healthy counterbalance to the U.S. presence in the region, it also may have brought the region very close to being the scene of a superpower conflict involving nuclear weaponry. Because of repeated complaints from the Arab forces, mainly the Egyptians who were surrounded by the Israelis in the Sinai, abut Israeli violations of cease-fire agreements, the Soviet Union issued on October 24 a warning to the United States that they were prepared to take "appropriate steps unilaterally." (Sachar 783, Golan 90). Kissinger, taking the Soviet warning, which was directly from Brezhnev, as a possible nuclear threat, telephoned Nixon. Within hours, U.S. military bases worldwide were on "Defcom B" status, which is one step below a full nuclear alert. When Soviet Intelligence learned of the American alert, they relented and made immediate moves to establish a more conciliatory dialogue with the American administration and t he United Nations, dropping some of their previous demands.
Added note, 2016: Declassified memo from Soviets to Americans seems foggy and hard to understand in 2016, but the Soviets were taking action fast to calm tensions between the United States and Soviet Union after the start of Yom Kippur War in 1973. Link below demonstrates that the Soviets were unwilling to consider the use of nuclear weaponry to end hostilities. See link below. This document was not available when I wrote the report in 1991:
https://www.cia.gov/library/
Because of this incident, the lack of restraint on all sides during this war became shockingly obvious. Would the superpowers have really begun a nuclear war over territory not even the size of the American West Coast or the Soviet Ukrainian Republic? Had the belligerents known what was happening between the superpowers as they fought, would they have kept fighting? The question is more than academic since it is probable that at least one Middle Eastern nation is now nuclear-capable in 1991. -- 30 --
july 28 2016 thur 2 30 p.m.
(6) Military Force: A Review of the Syrian Strategy
1973 MEMO FROM WHITE HOUSE TO SECRETARY OF STATE ABOUT YOM KIPPUR WAR THEN IN PROGRESS AND OTHER ISSUES IN THE WORLD (LINK LINE BELOW) FROM U.S. ARCHIVES NOW DECLASSIFIED:
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1973-10-11-CM.pdf
Syria's attack began on October 6, 1973 about 2 p.m. with low-level air strikes, artillery barrages on Israeli targets in the Golan and over 45,000 troops with tanks backing up the artillery assault lines. Their plan was to vastly outnumber the Israelis, which they did, and make their way down through the Golan Heights to the area of the Jordan river before the Israelis could amass strength in the area. The terrain, especially around Mt. Hermon in the north, was steep enough to slow the Syrian advance. However, the Syrians were persistent and well-armed, which enabled them to pound Israeli targets repeatedly. It was not until the morning of October 7 that the Israelis were able to get air support to the Golan. By then, the Syrians had advanced halfway to the Jordan River (Safran 296).
By the end of October 7, the Syrians had advanced as far as three miles from the Bnot Yaacof Bridge across the Jordan River in the center of the front, near the village of Hermonit in the north and in the south as far as the town of El Al, which is roughly five miles from the Sea of Galilee. They had also advanced toward the town of Kuneitra.
But by October 9, the Syrians began to encounter heavy resistance along different points of the Golan, mainly because the Israelis were finally able to reinforce their positions and because they were able to finally see what was actually going on in the Golan. The advantages the Syrians had enjoyed up to this point were largely due to poor information on the Israeli side and the advantage of the surprise attack. After this, the Syrians had begun to retreat at several points. By t he early hours of October 10, the Syrians were pushed back behind the pre-October 6 lines (Safran 301).
By October 13, not only had the Syrians lost all of the ground they gained in the first few days of the offensive, but the Israeli forces had advanced to a new line which was only 20 miles from Damascus. Luckily for the Syrians, however, they decided not to advance any further, because they knew it would result in heavy casualties. However, the Syrians were far from
map
destroyed, and in the meantime, Iraqi and Jordanian forces had joined in to assist the Syrians and the Soviets were airlifting replacement weapons to the Syrians (Safran 304). By October 21 and 22, the Israelis captured the last Syrian stronghold on Mr. Hermon, ans the Syrians were busy forming a line to protect Damascus. From that point on, most of the activity between Syria and Israel consisted of small, ineffective skirmishes and struggles to achieve a reliable cease-fire agreement.
Why did the Syrians begin to lose ground after initially making strong advances? Why have Arab forces repeatedly lost Arab-Israeli wars? The answer might be in the terrain of the attack routes from the Arab nations to Israel. As bad as Israel's strategic situation is portrayed to be by the Israelis themselves, it is quite far from defenseless. The most strategic portion of the Israeli border with Jordan is blocked by the Dead Sea. North of the Dead (Sea) is the West Bank, which Israel occupies, and south of the Dead Sea is the Negev, an arid, sparsely populated region which would be difficult to invade because of the terrain. It is also unworthy of Invasion because by the time Jordanian forces would make headway, they would find themselves stuck fighting in a harsh, rocky, hot battlefield far from population centers. Even small numbers of infiltrators always get caught because there are few hiding places in the desert. Much of the same principle applies for the Egyptians; the Sinai has few hiding places and oncoming troops are easily spotted. Even if the Egyptians gain ground, the Israelis could always afford to pull back in order to gather their strength. Strategically, this whole area has plenty of room for maneuver. The traditional Syrian invasion route through the Golan Heights has one distinct disadvantage: it is mountainous and difficult to get through quickly. However, if the Syrians had been able to ever get over this obstacle, they surely might have been more successful. As far as the Lebanese border is concerned, it is small enough to be managed by the Israelis. It is not difficult to defend because of its size. So the traditional Arab attack routes may look like a sure thing, but they are actually quite difficult and the same problems have cropped up over and over again.In the 1973 war, the Egyptians found themselves trapped in the Sinai and the Syrians found themselves slowed down in the Golan eventually, in spite of a strong initial attack (The Times Family Atlas 45).
Syria made an error. Syrian strategic planners would have been better off either building up a strong air force or a strong naval force. A coastal attack by both the Egyptian and Syrian navies would have been difficult and possibly inadequate for anything beyond the first two days of the war, but it might have kept the Israelis busy enough to stage a more effective Arab air battle and ground attack. The key to any Arab victory over the Israelis lies in the forced scattering of Israeli forces. The Arabs have vast human resources, the Israelis do not. This is assuming, of course, that the Arabs do not wish to go to the extreme measures of launching a chemical, biological or nuclear attack. Barring these options, the only hope for the Arabs in winning a conventional war, taking into account the geography of the region, would be to build up their air and naval forces. Even then, victory would be far from easy.
C. The Policy Outcome: Few Rewards
The end of the 1973 war left Syria with more confidence than the humiliating Six-Day War of 1967. However, they did not recapture the Golan Heights and they did not obtain major concessions from Israel. Their Arab allies all but abandoned them when Syria insisted on taking a hard line with respect to the oil embargo and, later, Egypt left Syria on the bench by making peace with Israel. They also may have contributed to bringing the Middle East close to a superpower nuclear conflict. In all, the outcome of Syria's decision to enter the 1973 war was unconstructive.
II. The Explanation of the Foreign Policy Action
A. The Purpose of the Policy Makers
The purpose of the Syrians was to recapture the Golan Heights. The reason why they wanted to recapture the Golan Heights is because it would give them control over a very strategic piece of land overlooking Israel. Having this strategic area would give them more control over regional policy decisions. So long as they do not have any credible threat to pose to Israel, they cannot persuade the Israelis into any course of action favorable to Arab or Syrian interests because they have no credible penalty with which to threaten Israel. Having persuasive power over the Israelis would make the Syrians more influential in the region, and more influential with their Arab allies. Most of all, President Hafez al-Assad's security within Syria would be strengthened (Newsweek, Feb. 1974).
B. Choices Selected and Rejected
2. Rejected and Selected Choices: Considerations in the Syrian Decision
Syria might have tried to get to the core of the problem with Israel and negotiate, but several factors prevented them from making this decision:
-- The international community might intervene after the war, especially since there were threats of an oil embargo, to press the Israelis in negotiations. This way, the Arab allies could at least move beyond the diplomatic stalemate that had been in force since the end of the Six-Day war.
-- Israel never defined what it expected the Arabs to do to achieve a diplomatic settlement. In fact, the Arab allies might have assumed that demands by Israel would surely be above the level of what they were willing to deliver. This pushed them toward the war option.
-- By going to war, the Arab leaders were confident that they would be able to negotiate from, if not a much better position, at least an improved position. Their main goal was to force diplomatic movement on the question of occupied Arab lands.
-- The Arabs were still feeling the sting of humility from the loss in 1967. At the least, by fighting another war they hoped to at least regain some of their national dignity. (Sachar, Safran)
b) Influential Factors
(1) Objective Conditions
As was mentioned before, the initial Syrian attack employed 45,000 men. This, contrasted with the Israeli force of 5,000 men (each side had extra forces serving in other capacities), shows that the human resources of Syria were far above those of Israel. This influenced the Syrian decision to use a strategy of trying to overwhelm Israeli forces with numbers. Also, the geological conditions of the region played a major role, which was also discussed earlier in this paper.
(2) The Organizational (Government) Influence
Looking for the organizational influences on the Syrian decision is difficult because the Syrian government is a closed system, even by the standards of dictatorial regimes. In other words, the old Soviet empire was definitely a dictatorship, but we were able throughout the years to find out what made the Soviets come to certain policy decisions and which Soviet policy makers played a role. In Syria, there is rarely such information available to the public. Former U>S. Ambassador to Cairo Lucius D. Battle wrote this of the Syrians in 1973: "The Syrian action and the analysis therof I will not attempt. The Syrians are not notably logical, by any standards. They have shown neither restraint nor responsibility in any area of activity in recent history. I make no apology for failing to comprehend their actions. It suffices if any light can b e thrown on Egypt's position." (New York Times 1973). Henry Kissinger made a similar remark. "I have no feel for the Syrians," Kissinger was quoted as saying. (Newsweek 1974). Kissinger also said the Assad was "extreme and irrational" -- a comment made as he was trying to negotiate between the Syrians and the Israelis. (Golan 182).
During negotiations, Assad was demanding that Syria be given back all of the territory Israel had captured in the Golan during the October campaign. They were arguing particularly over the town of El Quneitra, which the Israelis did not want to return. These negotiations were so stiff that it took Kissinger days of shuttling between Damascus and Jerusalem just to get them to agree on using the same map (Golan 196). Once he finally persuaded the two to agree on that, the Syrians would suddenly increase their list of demands. Then, the Israelis would suddenly change the map. Then, the Syrians would increase their demands
map
even further.
What can we learn about the Syrian government from these incidents? What kind of influence did the government under Assad have on Syria's foreign policy? It would seem that the Syrian government follows the Rational-Actor model to arrive at foreign policy decisions. Assad was using the negotiations to get as much information as possible about the Israeli position. By continually changing his demands, he was simply trying to find out what the Israelis were really willing to negotiate about and what they were truly firm about. In the Middle East, bargaining wither between national leaders of between a merchant and a customer at an outdoor bazaar never begins with truthful statements. The parties involved get to the heart of the matter over time through the bargaining process. Only then can they decide whether a deal is possible. This is what happened in the negotiations following the 1973 war, and the Syrian government proved to be a deliberate, intelligent, careful, cautious negotiator. Assad was far from irrational or illogical as observers like Henry Kissinger have characterized him.
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7-31-16 start
(3) Informational Factors
One of the unusual characteristics of the Syrian foreign policy pattern is the unique immunity the Syrian government has developed to outside events. Egypt was able to make peace with Israel. The Syrians were not inspired to do so. The pleadings of other nations in the world toward the Syrians for cooperation in the diplomatic arena have almost always fallen on deaf ears. The Soviets, the United Nations, OPEC members and the Americans have always been unsuccessful in influencing the Syrians to take particular foreign policy actions (Newsweek 1974).
So, the answer to the question of who influences the Syrians is this: no one. Not the media of the outside world, not the United Nations and not even Syria's closest allies like the Soviet Union. That is, not on foreign policy questions of war and peace. (Lippman)
C. The Belief System as a Cause
Foremost in the Syrian decision to go to war is the belief in Pan-Syrianism. Daniel Pipes provided this insight on it:
"On first entering Syria, the observant traveler
will probably be startled to go through passport
control and notice a military map of Syria
on the wall, for this map contains several
anomalies. It shows the Golan Heights under Syrian
control, though they have been occupied by
Israel since 1967....Israel does not even exist;
instead, there is a state called Palestine. And
Palestine is separated from Syria by a line
designated a "temporary" border....The many
inaccuracies on this map reflect the Syrian rulers'
profound unwillingness to accept the actual size
and shape of the country they administer." (Pipes 3).
Another belief that the Syrians had at the time, and one that may still be valid now, is that Israel was deliberately trying to provoke the Arabs. "As we see it, the Israelis are deliberately trying to provoke Syria in the hope of finding a pretext to launch what they call a pre-emptive strike," said President Assad in September of 1974 as negotiations were dragging on. (Newsweek 1974). This statement made by Assad belongs in the larger category of Syrian justifications for military actions. Like many nations, Syrian foreign policy makers characterize most military initiatives as defensive, not offensive, actions.
The Syrian belief in the credibility of Pan-Arabism also played a role. However, it is difficult to tell from Assad's public statements which of the two beliefs prominent in Syria -- Pan-Arabism and Pan-Syrianism -- is considered more important for Syria. Pan-Arabism is the belief that all Araabs, no matter where they reside in the region, have goals that are essentially the same because there is a distinct Arab heritage, Arab culture, and Arab future. Pan-Syrianism, on the other hand, is a distinctly Syrian belief. In other words, it is unlikely that the Jordanians or Palestinians or Southeastern Turks would advocate Pan-Syrianism since that would entail the relinquishment of their self-determination to Syria. Pan-Syrianism and Pan-Arabism are conflicting beliefs, yet Syria has steadfastly promoted both. (Lippman, Pipes 157).
It is important to mention that Pan-Syrianism has enjoyed more popularity in Syria under Hafez al-Assad than it has under any other Syrian leader. So Pan-Syrianism has not always been as strong a factor in Syrian foreign policy as it has been in the last 20 years. (Pipes 150).
D. Paterns n War and Negotiation
Syria's relations with Israel since its creation in 1948 have been remarkably consistent; The two nations have been in a constant state of belligerency, military and/or diplomatic. Syria's diplomatic style has also been remarkably consistent. Aside from disengagement agreements with Israel, Syria has never negotiated with Israel seriously for a lasting peace.
3. Policy Assessment
A. The Instrumental: Objective Assessment
Syria's stated purpose of entering the war was to regain the Golan Heights from Israel. They failed to achieve this, but still had to suffer the costs. The Syrianss lost 3,500 soldiers in the war, and 1,000 Syrians were held as war prisoners by the Israelis. (Sachar 786). The combined losses of Egypt and Syria in equipment were 2,000 tanks and 500 planes. The Israelis lost 804 tanks, 114 planes and 2,552 soldiers.
The Arab nations did manage to gain considerable support through world opinion, however. This was mainly due to the oil embargo in Europe, to empathy in the Maghreb, and to profit motives as well as solidarity in the middle East. (Safran 498).
The Egyptians were the winners, if not of the war, of the diplomatic game which was played out after the cease-fire agreement. The Camp David Accords were signed between Israel and Egypt in 1979. The Syrians never moved beyond the Separation-Of-Forces Agreements of May 31, 1974. It is not clear, however, that they considered this a detracting factor. They have repeatedly said that there can be no Syrian/Israeli agreement without a deal on the Golan Heights. (New York Times 1991).
In summary, Syrian's decision to enter the 1973 war against Israel did not improve their strategic situation or improve the diplomatic stalemate which existed between Syria and Israel before the war. By objective standards, it was an ambitious, erroneously-planned effort which was completely unsuccessful.
B. The Judgmental Assessment: Subjective Assessment
Syria was and still is desperate to formulate solutions to its problems with Israel. The war was a frantic, though not irrational, attempt to do so. As far as the war itself, the course of it was fairy typical and, with the exception of Syria's treatment of the Israeli POWs, was no more a flagrant violation of human rights than any war, assuming all wars are incompatible with human rights, no matter how small or brief.
Syria made its biggest mistake in the negotiation period following the war, though. Losing the war might have been less painful if Assad would have been able to negotiate something beyond a cease-fire with the Israelis.
The war did not strengthen Syria's place within the Middle Eastern region, either. After the Camp David agreement, Syria discontinued its strong alliance with Egypt, as other nations did in the region. Then, Syria increased its isolation in the following years by sending forces to Lebanon and supporting Iran int the Iran-Iraq war. In hindsight, perhaps Syria was wise to make these decisions, but as a nation, Syria has been largely excluded from the world community.
Works Cited
Battle, Lucius D., "Arabs: Why Now", New York Times Magazine, October 21, 1973, page 32
Europa World Year Book, London, Europa Publications, 1991, page 2542-2552 (unlisted in paper)
Family Atlas of the World, Topsfield, Massachusetts, Salem House Publishers, 1989
Golan, Matti, The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger: Step by Step Diplomacy in the Middle East, New York, Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1976
Ibrahim, Youssef M., "Syria's Tough Choice: Changes in Relationships in Mideast Shift Balance of Power in the Region", New York Times, November 3, 1991, page 10
"Interview With Syria's President", Newsweek, September 23, 1974, page 59 (no author listed)
Lippman, Thomas W., Egypt After Nasser: Sadat, Peace, and the Mirage of Prosperity, New York, Paragon House, 1989
Macridis, Roy C., editor, Foreign Policy in World Politics: States and Regions, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1989
Paul R. Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, editors, The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980
Pipes, Daniel, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1990
Sachar, Howard M., A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1988
Safran, Nadav, Israel: The Embattled Ally, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1981
Shwadran, Benjamin, Middle East Oil Crises Since 1973, Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1986
"What Makes The Syrians Tick", Newsweek, February 11, 1974, page 38 (No author listed)
Annotated Bibliography
Books
Golan, Matti, The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger: Step by Step Diplomacy in the Middle East, New York, Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1976
A good account of the dialogue between Kissinger, the Israeli Government and the governments of Syria and Egypt following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. A clear picture emerges of the typical negotiation patterns between Syria and Israel, and of Syria's president Hafez al-Assad.
Lippman, Thomas W., Egypt After Nasser: Sadat, Peace, and the Mirage of Prosperity, New York, Paragon House, 1989
Good for some general background on the relationship between Syria and Egypt. Very little on Syria, but the reader can see how Egypt's foreign policy goals were vastly different from Syria's.
Macridis, Roy C., editor, Foreign Policy in World Politics: States and Regions, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1989
Good book for general names, dates and events of the Mideast region. Goes into little detail.
Paul R. Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, editors, The Jew In The Modern World: A Documentary History, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980
This book is nothing but a collection of government and other documents with footnotes. Looking at the text of the Balfour Declaration as it was written and the Mandate for Palestine written by the League of Nations allowed me to get a realistic feel for the history of the region, as well as an unbiased interpretation of the documents that became the source of the entire conflict. Everyone trying to research the roots of the Arab-Israeli rivalry should begin by reading these documents and then attempt to trace the conflict of the last 40 or so years from there.
Pipes, Daniel, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1990
Probably the best b0ok to come out on Syria lately. Pipes takes a subject -- Pan-Syrianism -- that has been ignored and ridiculed and gives it credibility through ample citations of speeches. He presents plenty of evidence for the existence of Pan-Syrianism as a force in the Middle East.
Sachar, Howard M., A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1988
Sachar is a sharp and careful scholar who, even when writing about Israeli history, goes into extensive detail on the political climate of the region. Unbeatable for details and numbers. Unfailingly accurate.
Safran, Nadav, Israel: The Embattled Ally, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1981
Safran's approach is close to Sachar's approach to history. The only difference is a slightly different interpretation. I found both books useful as a main source.
Shwadran, Benjamin, Middle East Oil Crises Since 1973, Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1986
I obtained this book from the author himself -- one of two required texts for his course on the history of oil in the Middle East. Shwadran is an excellent scholar and a slave-driving professor. He teaches at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. True or False: "King Ibn Saud (of Saudi Arabia) fully understood the structure and the purpose of budgets and he fully appreciated t he necessity of publicizing them." (This is one of the easy questions from one of his weekly quizzes, just for fun).
Articles
Battle, Lucius D., "Arabs: Why Now", New York Times Magazine, October 21, 1973, page 32
If nothing else, this article demonstrated the extent of confusion the Americans had with respect to Syria in the early 70s. The former ambassador made only a few terse comments about Syria then moved on to a discussion of Egypt. Few people in government had any real understanding of Syria during or after the 1973 war.
Ibrahim, Youssef M., "Syria's Tough Choice: Changes in Relationships in Mideast Shift Balance of Power in the Region", New York Times, November 3, 1991, page 10
One of the best, if not the best, reporter covering the Mideast fight now. I read him frequently. This article was an analysis of Syria, emphasizing their place in the recent talks in Madrid, Spain.
"Interview With Syria's President", Newsweek, September 23, 1974, page 59 (No author listed)
Translation of President Assad's remarks to a Newsweek reporter during the negotiations following the 1973 war.
"What Makes the Syrians Tick", Newsweek, February 11, 1974, page 38, (No author listed)
This article, an analytical story, had some good quotes from Kissinger and some other fair insights.
Atlases, Reference Books
Europa World Year Book, London, Europa Publications, 1991, page 2542-2552 (unlisted in paper)
I used this as a quick reference to double-check facts.
Family Atlas of the World, Topsfield, Massachusetts, Salem House Publishers, 1989
This atlas is packed with information on Geography. I used it mainly for the "military force" section of my paper. It is very difficult for me to analyze military strategies, but this atlas helped.
For Pol Past Act Paper
Final Critique
Helzer, Lurene Maximum Score 200
Score 185
1. This is all part of the background and should have shifted there.
2. If you had consulted the model carefully, you would have seen that the place for explanation is not there, but in the second main section of the paper. You are jumping the gun here.
3. This simply is not a scholarly source. Since such sources are in abundance, it seems strange that you did not use them. This makes your analysis less credible.
4. Other Assad values might have been discussed as well.
General comment: An exceptionally well-written and carefully analyzed paper. Moreover, it was really quite interesting. You have a fine command of the language and a graceful style which made the whole matter come alive. The paper was also quite free of compositional errors!! I was disappointed that you did not consult, nor cite some of the scholarly works on the conflict. Nonetheless, a first rate paper!! Congratulations!! grade: 190 minus 5 errors=85
